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Benjamin Barrosa b s t r a c t
Much contemporary debate on the nature of mechanisms centers on the issue of modulating negative
causes. One type of negative causability, which I refer to as ‘‘causation by absence,’’ appears difﬁcult to
incorporate into modern accounts of mechanistic explanation. This paper argues that a recent attempt
to resolve this problem, proposed by Benjamin Barros, requires improvement as it overlooks the fact that
not all absences qualify as sources of mechanism failure. I suggest that there are a number of additional
types of effects caused by absences that need to be incorporated to account for the diversity of causal con-
nections in the biological sciences. Furthermore, it is argued that recognizing natural variability in mech-
anisms, such as attenuation, leads to some interesting line-drawing issues for contemporary philosophy
of mechanisms.
 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences1. Introduction
The speciﬁcation of negative causes is an integral part of molecu-
lar biology and neurobiology. Terms such as antagonists, blockers,
repressors, depressors, gates, and gene-knockouts, for example,
exemplify instances of negative causation. It is widely agreed that
these terms play a fundamental role in mechanistic explanation (Cra-
ver, 2007; Machamer, 2004). There are several types of causal claims
that might be regarded as ‘‘negative’’, including preventions/interfer-
ences, omissions/absences, disconnections, and mixtures of these. In
this paper, I scrutinize the putative problem of causation by absence
as it occurs in the context of mechanistic explanation.
According to one of the most prominent accounts of mechanis-
tic explanation, advocated by the team of Peter Machamer, Lindley
Darden and Carl Craver (2000), mechanisms are speciﬁed through
descriptions of their entities and activities that are organized so as
to causally produce some phenomenon. Since the mechanistic pro-
duction view of causation requires some sort of transfer of energyor force from one entity to another, an absence cannot participate
in such a transfer. They lack the appropriate ‘‘oomph’’, which is the
physical connection between causes and their effects (Beebee,
2004; Dowe, 2004; Schaffer, 2004, 2005). Therefore, it is hard to
see how there can be a physically dependent relationship (i.e.
oomph between C and E) in terms of production between a nothing
and a something.1 Barros (2013) recently suggested a solution to
this problem that relies on interpreting absences as causes of mech-
anism failure.
This paper argues that resolving this problem by categorizing
absences as instances of mechanistic failure is unsatisfactory. It is
argued that, at least when it comes to the biological sciences,
one can speak of types of functionality, and degrees thereof, per-
taining to the same biological mechanism affected by an absence.
As such, these instances do not correspond well with the notion
of mechanism failure.
The next section of this paper discusses the notion of causal
productivity as it is commonly conceived of in leading accountsiscussion
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sences and suggest why they are essential for explaining biological
mechanisms in sciences such as neurobiology and physiology. Sec-
tion 4 considers the recent attempt by Benjamin Barros (2013) to
characterize absences as instances of mechanism failure. Here I ar-
gue that Barros’ solution is not complete since it leaves out several
important types of causes and effects associated with absences in
the biological sciences, notably the effects of attenuation. Section 5
presents a more nuanced approach for incorporating absences. The
penultimate section presents the consequences of mechanism
attenuation for the philosophy of mechanisms. The ﬁnal section
concludes the paper.
2. Causally productive mechanisms
This section considers the role of causal production in describ-
ing mechanisms. More speciﬁcally, I suggest why incorporating ab-
sences with mechanistic concepts of productivity have proved
elusive.
Philosophers of science have, in more recent years, offered a
plethora of mechanistic characterizations of causality and causal
explanation (e.g. Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005; Craver, 2007;
Glennan, 1996, 2002; Illari & Williamson, 2012; Machamer,
Darden, & Craver, 2000; Torres, 2009; Woodward, 2011). Although
there are considerable dissimilarities between these approaches,
they are extraneous to the points made in this paper. So, for clarity
of exposition, the main focus here is on the Machamer et al. (2000)
account. These authors characterize mechanisms as follows:
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they
are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to ﬁnish
or termination conditions. (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 3)
At the heart of Machamer, Darden and Craver’s analysis is the idea
of physical dependency between the organizational features
responsible for producing, maintaining and underlying phenomena.
Notably, these features can only be accounted for by ontic referents.
So, for example, in explaining how a neuron’s membrane potential
depolarizes during an action potential, the ontic condition conﬁnes
the citing of explanans to physical objects, such as the increase in
permeability to Na+ (Craver, 2007). This means that only entities
and activities physically present in mechanisms, such as Na+, qual-
ify as component parts of mechanisms and explainers thereof.
For this reason, modern mechanists place signiﬁcance in the on-
tic structure that mechanisms describe by seeking to characterize
the link between the causal producers of change. This strategy
turns on connecting mechanistic models to physical structures,
i.e. mechanisms responsible for producing the phenomenon of
interest. The more speciﬁc notion of ontic adequacy requires that
the elements described in the model map the elements found in
the mechanism. Only in this respect, by describing the links in-
volved in the operation of mechanisms, do mechanisms become
informative in the ontic sense (Craver, 2006; Kaplan, 2011).2
However, Machamer, Darden and Craver’s way of framing cau-
sal interaction as physically continuous processes becomes prob-
lematic when implementing absences as causes and effects in
descriptions of mechanisms. It would appear that absences resist
any stronger ontological reading because, as Jonathan Schaffer puts
it, ‘‘absence causation is metaphysically abhorrent. When the gar-
dener does not water my ﬂowers, there is no energy-momentum
ﬂow or other physical process connecting this absence (wherever
located, if at all) to the wilting ﬂowers. Absences impart no
‘oomph’.’’ (Schaffer, 2005, p. 300, emphasis in original). Hence, it2 To be clear, I am not conﬂating the ontic view with the physical process view here. On
process account of causation.appears that the problem with ﬁtting absences into mechanistic
explanations of productivity is that absences violate the (mecha-
nistic) condition of physical connectivity since they impart no
‘‘oomph’’.
It is my hope that this section has explained why the concept of
causal productivity, as it is currently conceived of in terms of phys-
ical continuous processes, appears to be incompatible with the
idea of absences as causes and causal explainers of mechanisms.
In the discussion that follows, I argue that absences are an essential
part of mechanistic explanation by referencing examples of their
role as causes and effects in the biomedical sciences and beyond.
The idea is that the problem of incorporating absences has to be re-
solved to obtain a more complete understanding of the way mech-
anisms and mechanistic explanations are essential concepts in
these sciences.
3. Causation by absence in the biological sciences
In this section I explore absences in scientiﬁc practices where
they are cited most frequently. I also illustrate two features of ab-
sences that deserve emphasis. First, that cases of causation by ab-
sence, such as in Helen Beebee’s example, ‘‘I killed the plant by not
watering it’’ (Beebee, 2004), display no physical continuity be-
tween Beebee’s omission to water the plant and its subsequent
death. Second, I suggest that there is a slight yet important differ-
ence between describing the lack of calcium as causing stunted
plant growth, and describing the (total) absence of calcium as caus-
ing the death of the plant’s terminal buds.
It is commonly conceived that absence causation is the notion
that treats the non-existence of an event as a cause/effect. Of
course, there are innumerable examples to choose from for the
purpose of illustrating causes and effects by absences, a fact that
has been duly noted by many philosophers, especially Schaffer:
‘‘What causes scurvy is an absence of vitamin C, what causes rick-
ets is an absence of vitamin D, what causes diabetes milletus is an
absence of insulin . . .’’ (Schaffer, 2004, p. 202). I center the discus-
sion here on two interesting examples from physiology and
neurophysiology.
The ﬁrst example considers lactose intolerance, which is a disor-
der affecting the digestion of lactose. Lactose is a disaccharide com-
posed of glucose and galactose and is replete in milk and milk-based
food products. The inability to absorb lactose is most probably
caused by a deﬁciency of the enzyme lactase (Vesa, Marteau, &
Korpela, 2000). This intestinal enzyme is responsible for hydrolyzing
lactose into its constituent monosaccharides, glucose and galactose.
Monosaccharides such as glucose and galactose are simple carbohy-
drates that can be absorbed in the digestive tract. Lactase makes
digestion possible by breaking down more complex carbohydrates,
such as lactose, because disaccharides like lactose and sucrose are
too large to be absorbed (i.e. transported from the intestinal lumen
across the epithelium into the bloodstream).
Lactose intolerance is one of several digestive disorders that
might be caused by a deﬁciency in the lactase gene or induced
by environmental factors. Such deﬁciencies are caused by an ab-
sence. In this case, the absence can be understood as either a piece-
meal lack of something, such as lactase or calcium, for example, or
it can be understood as the complete non-existence of something,
such as a regulatory gene. Seemingly, biology and biomedicine has
an abundance of each type. It goes without saying that biomedical
scientists investigating the causes of these diseases would be
vexed by the view that absences are not genuine causes, since rea-
soning about absences underpins most of their work.e could be committed to an ontic explanation without being committed to a physical
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many mechanistic processes. For instance, the very common chain
of events when the absent lactase gene (absent from birth) leads to
lactose intolerance, which in turn leads to decreased milk (cal-
cium) consumption, which may then lead to nutrition-related dis-
eases such as osteomalacia and rickets, as regularly effected by
calcium deﬁciency. This example illustrates that a complicated ser-
ies of interconnected events involving effects/causes due to ab-
sences are common in contemporary physiology.
I turn now to the second example. In neurobiology, the last cou-
ple of decades have witnessed some very exciting research on the
biochemistry underlying the formation of long-term memory.3 The
phenomenon of long-term potentiation is considered a useful model
for studying synaptic changes that underlie memory and learning. It
is commonly understood that the N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA)
receptor4 has a pivotal role in the mechanism of long-term
potentiation.
NMDA is a structural analog of glutamate, which is a negatively
charged amino acid and a constituent of protein. In the central ner-
vous system, glutamate (i.e. glutamic acid) acts as an excitatory
neurotransmitter that binds to glutamate receptors, such as the
NMDA receptor, and forms a channel through the membrane of
postsynaptic neurons. As NMDA binds to the NMDA receptor, the
ion channel opens by discharging the Mg2+ ion blocking the chan-
nel. This allows the intracellular build-up of calcium (Ca2+) ions to
diffuse through the neuronal membrane via the ion-channels into
the cell. Since the Mg2+ ions prevent Ca2+ ions from entering the
ion-channels, the absence of Mg2+ is an intermediate cause of the
inﬂux of Ca2+ in the process, ultimately leading to the strengthen-
ing of the synapse (long-term potentiation).
This example of long-term potentiation, which has become the
pet example of philosophers of science, illustrates how an absence
can effectuate the productivity of a causal process without there
being a physical connection between every cause and effect in
the mechanistic chain of events along the way. Evidently, there is
no physical interaction taking place between the Mg2+ and Ca2+
ions in the mechanism of long-term potentiation.
The lesson from these examples is to recognize how biological
and neurobiological practice treats absences as causal producers
of change. In this respect, the integration of absences becomes cru-
cial for making sense of their roles as causes and causal explainers
of mechanisms in scientiﬁc practice.
4. Absences as instances of mechanism failure
One proposed way of resolving the incorporation problem is by
treating absences as causes of mechanism failure. The literature on
causation provides many accounts of causal failures, usually repre-
sented as deviations from default values (Menzies, 2009). By incor-
porating these ideas in the context of mechanistic explanation,
Benjamin Barros (2013) proposes an interesting approach that con-
siders a mechanism’s failure to operate, as caused by the absence
of background conditions and/or entities required for that
mechanism:
Under this approach, an operational mechanism provides a
baseline with which to contrast the mechanism’s failure, and
the absence provides the causal explanation for differing out-
comes. Mechanism failure may be caused by the absence of a
background condition required for the mechanism’s operation,3 Numerous experiments with transgenic mice as models of spatial learning have gained
The methodology inherent in this research turns on creating genetically engineered mut
absence on cognition, see, e.g. John Bickle’s (2006) paper.
4 NMDA receptors are ligand-gated ion channels acting as mechanisms for the modulat
5 Ned Hall makes a similar point regarding the notion of failure by suggesting that an abor it may be caused by the absence of a part or entity from
the mechanism. (Barros, 2013, p. 466)
Barros offers two ways to describe absences as causes of mecha-
nism failure.5 The ﬁrst is by citing one or several missing background
conditions as explanans. Barros illustrates this idea with an example
involving a match-striking mechanism designed to operate in the
normal earth atmosphere.
It follows that as long as the device operates in the normal earth
atmosphere it will, ceteris paribus, maintain its operational ability:
that of igniting a match. However, if the match-striking device is
instead placed in a box containing nothing but pure nitrogen, the
device would fail to operate (i.e. the match would not ignite).
The reason why the match-striking device fails to ignite the match
in the latter case is due to the absence of oxygen. This information
is obtained by comparing the ﬁrst instance, where the match-strik-
ing device operates normally, with the latter instance, where the
match-striking device fails to operate. Hence, the operational fail-
ure indicates that oxygen is a background condition required for
the match to ignite. The absence of oxygen can therefore be cited
as explaining the match-striking device’s failure to operate.
The second way of explaining a mechanism’s failure to operate
is by citing a part or entity that is missing from that mechanism.
Barros uses Schaffer’s well-known gun ﬁring example to illustrate
his point (see Schaffer, 2005). In short, if a certain part is missing
from the gun ﬁring mechanism, the mechanism might fail to oper-
ate by reference to the absence of that part, e.g. a spring or a level.
The state of the mechanism’s failure is explained by comparing it
with the state of a functional mechanism, that is, by contrasting
the non-operational structure with the operational structure.
It does not seem unreasonable to assert, as Barros does, that the
difference in outcome can at times be explained by the absence of
necessary conditions as required for the mechanism to operate. How-
ever, it might be a bit too presumptuous to conclude that, ‘‘[a]bsences
[. . .] can be best understood as a part of a causal explanation of mech-
anism failure’’ (Barros, 2013, p. 468). Let me explain why.
The notion of ‘‘mechanism failure’’ implies a complete loss of a
mechanism’s operational capacity (i.e. its ability to function). How-
ever, loss of function in a mechanism is essentially gradual. Con-
sider, for example, instances of functional decay such as
Parkinson’s disease, where the absence (deﬁciency) of dopamine-
generating cells in the substantia nigra leads to a gradual loss
(atrophy) of memory and other cognitive abilities. The process of
memory decay is described as ‘‘gradual’’ because the production
of dopamine is severed and diminishing, but it is not entirely dis-
rupted. Although an absence is responsible for the decaying effect
on memory, the effect in question does not satisfy Barros’ criteria
for failure since there is no disruption in operation.
I suggest that the phenomena under study, which could be
called ‘‘the effects on mechanism dynamics caused by absences,’’
is transitory and varied. As such, the absence of an entity or activity
can both strengthen and weaken a mechanism. In addition, we saw
that the failure of dopamine-generating cells to produce dopamine
leads to the absence of dopamine, which, in turn, affects cognition.
5. Absences as instances of mechanism attenuation and
mechanism enhancement
Under Barros’ conditions, absences are useful for distinguishing
between operational and non-operational mechanisms. In morethe attention of philosophers in debates about reduction and reductive explanation.
ant mice lacking the expression of certain genes and then tracing the effects of the
ion of synaptic plasticity and memory.
sence can be understood as describing ‘‘the failure of c to occur’’ (Hall, 2004, p. 248).
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ing absences as leading to mechanism failure is not as clear-cut.
It is my view that the notion of causation by absence has the
advantage of going beyond merely characterizing and explaining
all-or-nothing phenomena. If we were interested, for example, in
whether absences add to or diminish certain operational features
of any given mechanism, we would have to identify additional cau-
sal arrangements that are caused by absences. In doing so, we need
to expand on the idea that absences are the causal explainers of
mechanism failure by recognizing additional modes of effect
caused by absences.
In neurobiology, as in the biological and biomedical sciences in
general, absences can lead to attenuation, a phenomenon that is
very different from failure or malfunction. As mentioned previ-
ously, mechanisms negatively affected by an absence usually entail
the debilitation of a mechanism, that is, the depletion of strength
or exhaustion of a mechanism, but rarely a complete operational
failure. Such degenerating effects are evident in cases of clinical
depression, where the normal function of synaptic transmission
is affected by the absence of dopamine, and hence the mechanism’s
operation is weakened, but nonetheless operational. Research re-
ports in bioscience and bioengineering journals provide many
cases of attenuation, evidenced by article titles such as ‘‘Acetami-
nophen attenuates dopamine neuron degeneration in animal mod-
els of Parkinson’s disease’’ (Locke, Fox, Caldwell, & Caldwell, 2008)
and ‘‘Sensorimotor attenuation by central motor command signals
in the absence of movement’’ (Voss, Ingram, Haggard, & Wolpert,
2006). I would even go so far as to suggest that instances of mech-
anism attenuation are more common than instances of mechanism
failure, at least in the biological sciences. For instance, Type 2 dia-
betes, the form that occurs when the body produces insufﬁcient
amounts of insulin, is considerably more common than Type 1 dia-
betes, the form that occurs when the body does not produce any
insulin at all (Evans, Thornton, Chalmers, & Glasziou, 2011). The ef-
fects of the absences in question are therefore best understood as
part of the causal explanation for mechanism attenuation.
To explain the idea of attenuation, consider what electrical
engineers call an attenuator device. This electronic device reduces
the power of a signal without distorting its (fundamental) wave-
form. Similarly, an ampliﬁer is a device that works in the opposite
manner; increasing the power of a signal. These two devices pro-
vide either loss or gain in signal amplitude. Similar to the range
of possible variations in signal amplitudes, the possible effects of
absences come in a continuous scale of varying degrees of effects,
ranging from a small lack of, to a complete (total) absence of, enti-
ties or activities underlying mechanistic phenomena. In contrast to
malfunction, examples of attenuation dissipate power, without
distorting the (fundamental) signal.
Recall the gun ﬁring example above inwhich Barros suggests that
the absence of a part or entity from the operational baseline of the
mechanism leads to mechanism failure. The following example aims
to show that even the absence of a baseline component of a mech-
anism does not necessarily entail failure, or even attenuation.
Neuropharmacological agents, known as serotonin reuptake
inhibitors, decrease the breakdown of the neurotransmitter seroto-
nin, thereby making more serotonin available. Serotonin reuptake
inhibitors have an inhibitory effect on the molecular transport sys-
tem that removes serotonin from the synaptic cleft. This causes the
absence of serotonin removal agents, which in turn leads to
increased concentrations of serotonin in the brain. In contrast
to the characterization of absences as being responsible for6 According to Wakeﬁeld’s analysis, disease/disorder is something that involves some kin
selected during evolution’’ (Lemoine, 2013, p. 320, my emphasis).
7 Garson proceeds to suggest that ‘‘there is no mechanism for heart disease or Alzheime
not a function of that system . . .since pathologies are almost universally held to be dysfunmechanism failure, the absence of serotonin removal agents pro-
vides an example where the absence of an entity is causally
responsible for enhancing the operation of a mechanism by making
more serotonin available for postsynaptic binding. In line with the
attenuator device analogy above, the absence in question increases
the efﬁcacy of transmission.
The point is that there are many ways in which an absence can
have an effect on a mechanism. By appreciating this variety, we
have a larger array of conceptual tools and a better understanding
of causal efﬁcacy to work with. The idea behind this section is ‘‘a
weakened mechanism is still a mechanism’’ or conversely, ‘‘a
strengthened mechanism is still a mechanism’’.
To accord with empirical descriptions of mechanisms similar to
those described above, we need a characterization of the effects of
absence different to the one Barros provides. However, this does
not mean that we should disregard his insights, especially the idea
of mechanism failure and the use of baseline operations to com-
pare facts. Instead, we need to expand on this thinking by including
the understanding that the absence of an entity can both strength-
en and weaken a mechanism by including instances of attenuation
and enhancement in our explanations.
6. Functional variability
So far I have argued that the distinction between ‘‘function’’ and
‘‘failure’’ is inadequate because mechanistic phenomena are pri-
marily situated in a continuum between these two extremes and,
most often, not circumscribed (bound) by either. This observation,
however, raises a deep question about mechanisms: At what point
of attenuation does one mechanism become a different mecha-
nism? Put differently, if mechanisms are deﬁned and circum-
scribed by the phenomena they explain, at what point of
attenuation does the phenomenon become different?
The function/failure distinction is encountered in several areas
of philosophy of mechanisms. It is relied upon for differentiating
between health and disease (e.g. Wakeﬁeld, 1992).6 It is appealed
to for identifying functions in mechanisms (e.g. Craver, 2013).
Among other things, the distinction is invoked for explaining causa-
tion by absence (Barros, 2013) and for separating mechanisms from
non-mechanisms (e.g. Garson, 2013).
A body of recent literature has proposed that a mechanism
serves a function by being a mechanism for something that con-
tributes to the biological system in which it is contained. This
means that a mechanism is circumscribed by what ‘‘it is supposed
to do’’ (Craver, 2013, p. 138), which is achieved by ‘‘understanding
how parts of organisms work, how they break or become diseased’’
(p. 154). Correspondingly, Stuart Glennan notes that ‘‘[w]hen one
describes the behavior of a mechanism, one describes how it will
behave if it is not broken’’ (2005, p. 448). And Justin Garson more
recently adds, ‘‘heart disease is something that happens when this
mechanism is disrupted’’ (2013, p. 319).7 The key point here is that
thinking that a mechanism can behave differently or not at all fol-
lows from something that is not ‘‘constitutive of its functioning as
such’’ (Craver, 2013, p. 9) reﬂects a line of reasoning that is ubiqui-
tous in contemporary philosophy of mechanisms (see also, Bechtel
& Richardson, 1993, p. 19; Darden, 2006, p. 259; Illari & Williamson,
2010, p. 285). Consequently, the idea of failure or malfunction has
been central for explaining what mechanisms do when they are
not doing what they are supposed to do. As Craver remarks, ‘‘much
of physiological science such as neuroscience is driven not by the
goal of understanding how the nervous system functions when itd of biological dysfunction, ‘‘where dysfunction means the failure to produce an effect
r’s disease or schizophrenia because (for example) heart disease on part of a system is
ctional or non-functional states of a system’’ (pp. 320–322).
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can fail and how such failures might be predicted and controlled’’
(2013, p. 20).
Yet, reasons for the currently adopted scheme for circumscrib-
ing mechanisms are deeply problematic. Similarly to the previous
issue of accounting for the variability in instances of functional de-
cay in cases such as Parkinson’s disease, the source of this problem
can be traced back to what is arguably an over-simplistic distinc-
tion between functional and non-functional/broken mechanisms.
So, for example, if heart disease is due to a disruption in a mech-
anism’s operation, then the question arises: By how much does it
have to be disrupted before it develops into an abnormality? Con-
sidering that ‘‘normal’’ hearts pump 60–100 times per minute, it
remains whether 101 beats per minute constitutes a pathological
change. Similarly, should 59 beats per minute be interpreted as a
malfunction? Indeed, providing normative descriptions of this kind
has proven to be very elusive (McGrath, 2005). But it is especially
difﬁcult when presupposing two clearly delineated modes of func-
tionality, which can be somewhat crudely characterized as on/off
functioning. As indicated, there is no such thing as a sufﬁcient
amount of serotonin in the brain for it to function properly in the
on/off sense of functionality. Rather, the continuum between sufﬁ-
cient and insufﬁcient is best described as gradual.
The on/off approach to characterizing functionality has domi-
nated the discussion to the extent that mechanism functionality
appears to have two states: they are either functional or dysfunc-
tional. However, as I have argued throughout, on/off accounts of
mechanism function are implausible since they cannot account
for degrees of breakdown and the gradual nature of dysfunction
(i.e. mechanism attenuation). They also exclude a signiﬁcant pro-
portion of phenomena that cannot be appropriated within dichot-
omous formulations of functional variability. The function/failure
dichotomy precludes the understanding of a crucial feature of
mechanisms: attenuation or piecemeal variability in function.
Insofar as mechanism failure is not an all or nothing feature, the
idea of failure by degrees will not be compatible with the notion
of causally productive mechanisms (as opposed to the idea of
(absolute) failure). Although accounting for continuously varying
phenomena might prove more challenging, it nevertheless offers
a more accurate and fruitful approach to understanding biological
and biomedical phenomena. Ultimately, mechanism attenuation
presents many interesting line-drawing issues for contemporary
philosophy of mechanisms.7. Conclusion
The metaphysics of absences is a difﬁcult issue. In this paper I
suggest that a descriptively accurate account of scientiﬁc practice
needs to acknowledge discussion about effects leading to vacillat-
ing forms of operational functionality.
Through the use of examples in this paper, I suggest that ab-
sences are causally responsible for a wide spectrum of effects on
mechanistic operations, including attenuation and enhancement
and failure to operate. More generally, these examples illustrate
an important lesson from biological practice for accounts of causal
explanation. We have seen that, at least when it comes to the bio-
logical sciences, one can speak of types of functionality, and de-
grees thereof, pertaining to the same biological mechanism
affected by an absence.
I hope that the discussion in this paper has explained why Ben-
jamin Barros’ idea of mechanism failure is not sufﬁcient for a
descriptively adequate account of causation by absence in the
biological sciences. The effects of the absences in question are
therefore best understood as part of the causal explanation for
mechanism attenuation, enhancement and failure.In conclusion, I think that the account developed in this paper
captures a signiﬁcant aspect of scientiﬁc practice as concerning
most of the concepts scientists invoke to explain the effects of
absences. More importantly, I hope this paper consequently
shows that degrees of failure and mechanism attenuation are
incompatible with the dichotomous distinction between failure/
function that underwrites much of the contemporary philosophy
of mechanisms.
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